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Actual Federal Reserve 
Policy Behavior and 
Interest Rate Rules
conomists attempting to approximate the policy behavior
of the Federal Reserve often have done so by estimating 
interest rate rules for the United States. In these rules, the variable 
on the left-hand side is the interest rate that the Federal Reserve is 
assumed to control, while the variables on the right-hand side are 
those that are assumed to affect Federal Reserve behavior. 
There have been numerous examples of estimated interest 
rate rules over the past forty years. The first appeared in Dewald 
and Johnson (1963), who regressed the Treasury bill rate on a 
constant, the Treasury bill rate lagged once, real GNP, the 
unemployment rate, the balance-of-payments deficit, and the 
consumer price index. The next example can be found in 
Christian (1968), followed by many others. In 1978, I added an 
estimated interest rate rule to my U.S. macroeconometric 
model (Fair 1978). Later, McNees (1986, 1992) estimated rules 
in which some of the explanatory variables were the Federal 
Reserve’s internal forecasts of different variables, and Khoury 
(1990) provided an extensive list of estimated rules through 
1986. More recently, Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimated 
rules for various subsets of the 1970-97 period and Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler (2000) estimated them for different Federal 
Reserve chairmen. 
An interesting question that arises from these studies is 
whether the policy behavior of the Federal Reserve has 
changed over time.  If one interprets such behavior as being 
approximated by a particular rule, this question can then be 
viewed as whether the coefficients in the rule have changed 
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•  Several studies have attempted to model how 
the Federal Reserve makes policy choices 
affecting interest rates. These studies have 
yielded “rules” relating the interest rate that 
the Fed is assumed to control to a set of 
variables thought to affect Fed policy 
behavior. 
•  Many of these studies conclude that interest 
rate rules do not have stable coefficient 
estimates over time—a finding that 
suggests structural change in the Fed’s 
policy behavior.
• A specification of an interest rate rule, estimated 
over the 1954:1–1979:3 and the 1982:4–1999:3 
periods, does pass a stability test.
•  Nevertheless, the results show a large economic 
difference in the coefficient on inflation 
between the first and second periods, and the 
relatively restrained behavior of inflation in 
recent years makes it hard to determine 
whether there has been a structural break.
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over time. There seems to be a general view in the recent 
literature that estimated interest rate rules do not have stable 
coefficient estimates over time. For example, Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998, p. 3) observe that, “Overall, it appears that 
there have not been any great successes in modeling Federal 
Reserve behavior with a single, stable reaction function.”
It seems clear that the Federal Reserve’s policy behavior over 
the 1979:4-1982:3 period  (which I refer to as the “early 
Volcker” period) differed from that of other periods.1  The 
stated policy of the Federal Reserve during this period was to 
focus more on monetary aggregates than it had done before. 
Any interesting stability question must therefore exclude this 
period, since any hypothesis of stability that includes it is quite 
likely to be rejected.  One obvious hypothesis to test is whether 
a rule’s coefficients were the same before 1979:4 as they were 
after 1982:3.  In a recent paper (Fair 2000), I tested this 
hypothesis using the 1978 specified rule mentioned above, and 
it was not rejected.  Further test results are presented in the next 
section of this article.
If one finds a rule that seems to be a good approximation of 
the Federal Reserve’s policy behavior, how should the residuals 
from the equation be interpreted? It is important to realize that 
estimated interest rate rules in general are not optimal.  If the 
Federal Reserve behaves by minimizing the expected value of a 
loss function subject to a model of the economy, its optimal 
rule depends on all the predetermined variables in the model. 
The coefficients in the optimal rule are a combination of the 
coefficients in the loss function and the coefficients in the 
model. In this case, any estimated rule is just an approximation 
of the optimal rule, where the approximation may or may not 
be any good. If we assume that the Federal Reserve optimizes, 
then the actual values of the interest rate are the optimal values, 
so a residual for an estimated rule is the difference between the 
predicted value from the rule and the optimal (actual) value.  
The residuals are “mistakes” made by the econometrician, not 
by the Federal Reserve. This line of reasoning is pursued 
later on.
Estimated Interest Rate Rules
The rule that I added to my U.S. macroeconometric model in 
1978 has been changed slightly over time.  The main modification 
has been the addition of a dummy variable term to account for 
the change in Federal Reserve operating procedure during the 
early Volcker period. As noted above, the Federal Reserve’s stated 
policy during this period was to focus more on monetary 
aggregates than it had done in the past.  The estimated interest 
rate rule already had the lagged growth of the money supply as an 
explanatory variable, and the change in policy was modeled by 
adding the lagged growth of the money supply multiplied by a 
dummy variable as another explanatory variable.  The dummy 
variable is 1 for the 1979:4-1982:3 period and 0 otherwise.  
The specification of the rule used in this article is
(1)  
where r is the three-month Treasury bill rate,   is the quarterly 
rate of inflation at an annual rate, u is the unemployment rate,  
 is the quarterly rate of growth of the money supply at an 
annual rate, and D1 equals 1 for 1979:4-1982:3 and 0 otherwise. 
The estimates of equation 1 for three different sample periods 
are presented in Table 1.2
The endogenous variables on the right-hand side of 
equation 1 are inflation and the unemployment rate, and the 
two-stage least squares technique is used to estimate the 
equation.  In the first-stage regression, inflation and the 
unemployment rate are regressed on a set of predetermined 
variables (the main variables in the U.S. model, which can be 
found at <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu>).  The predicted 
values from these regressions are then used in the second stage. 
One can look at these regressions as those used by the Federal 
Reserve to predict inflation and the unemployment rate, so one 
need not assume that the Federal Reserve has perfect foresight. 
If the Federal Reserve’s expectations of future values of 
inflation and the unemployment rate affect its current decision, 
these expectations should be added to equation 1.  A way to test 
this possibility is to add future values of inflation and the 
unemployment rate to equation 1 and then estimate it using 
Hansen’s (1982) method-of-moments estimator, where the 
instruments used are the main predetermined variables in the 
U.S. model.  Hansen’s method in this context is simply two-
stage least squares adjusted to account for the serial correlation 
properties of the error term.  The test is to see if the future 
values are statistically significant.  I have performed this test on 
various versions of my estimated interest rate rules using 
different lead lengths, and the lead values do not turn out to be 
significant.3 Thus, there is no evidence that future values are 
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needed in equation 1, and they have not been used. Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler (2000) use future values in many of their 
specifications, but they point out (p. 164) that their conclusions 
are not changed if they do not use these values.  
Equation 1 is a “leaning-against-the-wind equation.” The 
variable r is estimated to depend positively on the inflation rate 
and the lagged growth of the money supply and negatively on 
the unemployment rate and the change in the unemployment 
rate. Adjustment and smoothing effects are captured by the 
lagged values of r. The coefficient on the lagged money supply 
growth is more than ten times larger for the early Volcker 
period than it is for the period before or after—a finding that is 
consistent with the Federal Reserve’s stated policy of focusing 
more on monetary aggregates during this period.  This method 
of accounting for the Federal Reserve’s policy shift does not, of 
course, capture the richness of the change in behavior, but at 
least it seems to capture some of the change.
The Wald value in Table 1 is used to test the hypothesis that 
the coefficients in the 1954:1-1979:3 period are the same as 
those in the 1982:4-1999:3 period. (The early Volcker period is 
excluded from this test, so the D1 term is excluded.) The Wald 
statistic is presented in Andrews and Fair (1988, equation 3.6).  
It has the advantage of working under very general assumptions 
about the properties of the error terms and can be used when 
the estimator is two-stage least squares, which it is here. The 
Wald statistic is distributed as  , with (in the present case) 
eight degrees of freedom.  The estimates of the equation for the 
two subperiods are presented in Table 1.  The value of the Wald 
statistic is 11.13, which has a p-value of .194. The hypothesis of 
equality thus is not rejected even at the 10 percent level.  
Equation 1, estimated for the entire 1954:1-1999 period, 
underwent a number of other tests.4 First, the lagged values of 
all the variables in the equation ( ) 
were added and the joint significance of these variables was 
tested.  The   value was 5.69, with five degrees of freedom, 
which has a p-value of .338.  Adding these variables 
encompasses a number of alternative hypotheses about the 
dynamics, and these hypotheses are rejected because the added 
variables are not significant.5 Second, the equation was 
estimated assuming first-order serial correlation of the error 
term.  The   value was 1.30, with one degree of freedom, 
which has a p-value of .255. Third, the percentage change in 
x
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Estimated U.S. Interest Rate Rule
1954:1-1999:3 1954:1-1979:3 1982:4-1999:3 1954:1-1999:3
Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient   t-Statistic
Constant .855 5.42 .762 3.36 .409 1.93 .663 3.98
.071 4.17 .077 3.05 .145 3.30 .080 4.35
-.131 -4.18 -.114 -3.00 -.085 -2.29 -.111 -3.55
-.748 -6.05 -.380 -3.04 -.901 -4.53 -.567 -4.43
.014 2.26 .027 3.65 .001 0.16 .010 1.73
.219 9.71 - - .349 8.72
.916 47.32 .887 21.60 .939 36.17 .922 38.71
.210 3.75 .251 2.89 .280 2.88 .338 5.36
-.345 -6.71 -.225 -2.54 -.195 -2.26 -.357 -7.23
-.148 -3.40
.060 1.67
SE .471 .411 .317 .450
.971 .960 .970 .974
DW 1.85 1 1.820 2.09o 2.17o
Wald (p-value) 11.13 (.194)
Number
  of observations 183 103 68 183
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is r. The estimation period is 1954:1-1999:3. The estimation technique is two-stage least squares. r  is the three-month
Treasury bill rate,   is the inflation rate, u is the unemployment rate, and   is the growth rate of the money supply. D1 equals 1 for 1979:4-1982:3, 
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real GDP was added (without excluding the change in the 
unemployment rate).  The   value was 0.51, with one degree 
of freedom, which has a p-value of .476.  Finally, an output gap 
variable and the change in the variable were added (without 
excluding the unemployment rate and the change in the 
unemployment rate).6  The   value was 2.43, with two degrees 
of freedom, which has a p-value of .297. Overall, the equation 
performs well in these tests.  The added variables, including the 
output gap and the change in the output gap, do not have 
additional explanatory power.  
When the unemployment rate and the change in the 
unemployment rate are added to the equation with the output 
gap and the change in the output gap already included, the   
value is 9.53, with two degrees of freedom, which has a p-value 
of .009.  The unemployment rate and the change in the 







Since the output gap and the change in the output gap do not 
have such power, in this sense the unemployment rate 
dominates the output gap. Many interest rate rules in the 
literature use some measure of the output gap as an 
explanatory variable, and the current results suggest that the 
unemployment rate may be a better variable.  
Returning to the stability test, again note that the passing of 
this test is contrary to the overall view in the literature. One 
likely reason why the stability hypothesis generally has been 
rejected is that most tests have included the early Volcker 
period, which is clearly different from the periods before and 
after. The tests in Judd and Rudebusch (1998), for example, 
include the early Volcker period.  
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) do not perform any 
stability tests; they simply note that the coefficient estimates for 
the different periods look quite different, especially the 
inflation coefficient. The equations for the two subperiods in 
Table 1 also show a large difference in the inflation coefficient.  
For the first subperiod, the long-run coefficient is 0.68 [=.077/
(1.0 - .887)], and for the second subperiod it is 2.38 [=.145/(1.0 
- .939)]. The Clarida, Galí, and Gertler coefficients (p. 150) are 
.83 for their pre-Volcker period (1960:1-1979:2) and 2.15 for 
their Volcker-Greenspan period (1979:3-1996:4).
Although the inflation coefficients seem quite different in 
Table 1, the Wald test does not reject the hypothesis of stability. 
It could be, however, that the test had low power, so another 
test was performed. This test is represented in the last two 
columns of Table 1. It is based on the assumption that all the 
coefficients are constant across time, except for the inflation 
coefficient, which is postulated to be different in each of the 
three subperiods: 1954:1-1979:3, 1979:4-1982:3, and 1982:4-
1999:3, which I refer to as the “first,” the “early Volcker,” and 
the “second” periods, respectively.  The coefficient estimate for 
 is the estimated difference between the early Volcker 
period and the first period. This difference is not of much 
interest, however, since the added variable is just meant to 
dummy out the early Volcker period.  The estimated difference 
is negative and significant (with a t-statistic of -3.40).  The total 
coefficient for this period is -0.068 [= .080 - .148].  This 
negative value is not sensible, reflecting the fact that the early 
Volcker period is unusual and hard to model.  (This is why the 
period was completely ignored in the Wald test.)  
The coefficient estimate for    is the estimated 
difference between the second and first periods. This estimated 
difference is .060, with a t-statistic of 1.67, which is not 
significant at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test.  Again, the 
long-run inflation coefficient for the second period of 1.79 
[= .080 + .060)/(1 - .922)] is noticeably larger than that for the 
first period of 1.03 [= .080/(1 - .922)].  
The results thus show a large economic, but not statistically 
significant, difference for the inflation coefficient between the 
first and second periods. One important fact to keep in mind is 
that the variance of inflation is much smaller in the second 
period than it is in the first. This can be seen from Chart 1, 
where inflation and the unemployment rate are plotted for the 
D1 p · ×
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Chart 1
Unemployment and Inflation: 1954:1-1999:3
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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1954:1-1999:3 period.  The largest value of inflation in the 
second period is 5.33 percent, in 1990:1, and no other value is 
above 5 percent.  However, the largest value for the first period 
is 12.83 percent, in 1974:3, and twenty-nine other values are 
above 5 percent.
If inflation were to rise substantially in the future, it would 
make for an interesting test of whether there has been a 
structural change in Federal Reserve policy behavior. The third 
equation in Table 1 implies a much larger Federal Reserve 
response than the first equation does; the test is which equation 
predicts the actual Federal Reserve response better.  If the third 
equation is the better predictor, we will have strong evidence in 
favor of a shift in behavior from the earlier period.  If the first 
equation excels, it will suggest that focusing only on the post-
1982 period, when inflation has been low, has resulted in 
misleading estimates (in effect, a small-sample problem).  In 
short, although the statistical tests in this article suggest that 
there has not been a shift in behavior, more observations are 
needed—particularly high-inflation ones—before much 
confidence can be placed in any conclusion. 
Deviations from the Rule
Equation 1, estimated for the 1954:1-1999:3 period, was solved 
dynamically for this period using the actual values of inflation, 
the unemployment rate, and the growth of the money supply.  
Chart 2 plots the predicted values from this simulation along 
with the actual values, and the appendix table presents the 
values.  The actual values of inflation, the unemployment rate, 
and the growth of the money supply are also presented in the 
appendix table. For this exercise, the Federal Reserve is 
assumed to know the current values of inflation and the 
unemployment rate, since the actual values of these two 
variables are used.  
Nine subperiods appear in Chart 2.  They represent periods 
in which the actual values differ from the predicted values by 
noticeable amounts for a number of consecutive quarters.  
There are six quarters in the early 1960s in which the interest 
rate was noticeably higher than predicted: 1959:4, 1960:1, and 
1961:1-1961:4, and there are three subperiods from the mid-
1980s for which this was true: 1984:1-1985:2, 1988:4-1991:4, 
and 1994:4-1998:1.  Conversely, the interest rate was noticeably 
lower than predicted in the mid-1950s, in the late 1960s, and in 
two periods in the 1970s: 1955:2-1957:3, 1966:1-1969:2, 
1971:1-1973:2, and 1976:4-1978:2.  Chart 2 presents the 
average deviation for each of these subperiods in parentheses.  
The largest average deviation in absolute value is -1.87 
percentage points, for the 1971:1-1973:2 period. 
Taylor (1999) presents charts similar to Chart 2 using 
calibrated interest rate rules, and he interprets the deviations as 
policy mistakes. According to this interpretation, Chart 2 
shows that the Federal Reserve’s policy was too tight in the early 
1960s, too loose in the late 1960s and in about half of the 1970s, 
and too tight in the mid-1980s, the late 1980s to early 1990s, 
and part of the second half of the 1990s. 
However, if the Federal Reserve is behaving optimally, then 
the deviations are actually errors made by the econometrician.  
At each Federal Open Market Committee meeting, the Federal 
Reserve clearly knows more than is reflected in the rule, even if 
Although the statistical tests in this article 
suggest that there has not been a shift in 
behavior, more observations are needed 
. . . before much confidence can be 
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Chart 2
Actual and Predicted Values of r :
1954:1-1999:3
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
author’s calculations.
Notes: Equation 1 in the text was estimated for the 1954:1-1999:3



















If the Federal Reserve is behaving 
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it is not formally solving an optimal control problem. According 
to this interpretation, deviations from the rule can be viewed as 
the use of more information by the Federal Reserve.
The Stabilization Effectiveness 
of Rules
There is a large literature examining the stabilization 
effectiveness of different interest rate rules. The general 
approach in this literature is to choose a rule and then use a 
model of the economy to examine how the economy would 
have behaved under the rule.7 Using a calibrated model of the 
economy, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) show that interest 
rate rules with inflation coefficients less than 1 can be 
destabilizing. They then criticize the Federal Reserve’s pre-1979 
policy for being too timid, but praise it after 1979. This 
evaluation of policy is based on the assumption that there was 
a change in behavior after 1979: the Federal Reserve used a 
coefficient less than 1 before that year and a coefficient greater 
than 1 after it. 
A different conclusion about interest rate rules is reached in 
Fair (2000) using the U.S. model mentioned above. Stochastic 
simulation was used to compute variances of the endogenous 
variables for different rules.8 The simulation period was 
1993:1-1998:4. 
The estimated rule in this article—estimated for the 1954:1-
1999:2 period—was first tried. The variances using this rule for 
real output, the price level, and the Treasury bill rate are 
presented in the first row of Table 2. Two calibrated rules were 
then tried.  The first was the Taylor rule, which has a coefficient 
of 0.5 on the output gap and 1.5 on inflation. The second was 
a rule with a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap but only 0.25 
on inflation; this will be called the “.25 rule.” The variances 
using these two rules are presented in the second and third 
rows of Table 2, respectively.
Compared with the estimated and .25 rules, the Taylor rule 
achieved a lower price level variance (0.61, versus 0.69 and 0.71) 
at the cost of a considerably higher interest rate variance (2.86, 
versus 1.14 and 1.19). Some insight into this result can be 
gleaned from a property of the price equation in the U.S. model, 
which is that the price level responds only modestly to demand 
(a common feature of most estimated price equations).  Since 
the interest rate affects the price level primarily through its effects 
on demand, the price level responds only modestly to interest 
rate changes.  The Taylor rule has a large coefficient on inflation, 
so a large price shock leads to a large change in the interest rate, 
but this in turn has only a modest impact on offsetting the effects 
of the price shock.  For a rule like the estimated or the .25 rule, 
the interest rate responds much less to a price shock, so the 
interest rate variance is smaller.  The cost of a smaller interest rate 
response in terms of offsetting the effects of the price shock is 
modest because of the modest effect of the interest rate on the 
price level. 
Why are the estimated and .25 rules not destabilizing, as 
they would be in the Clarida, Galí, and Gertler model? The 
answer is that the response of output to a price shock is much 
different in that model than it is in the U.S. model.  Consider a 
positive price shock with no change in the nominal interest 
rate.  In the Clarida, Galí, and Gertler model, this shock is 
expansionary because the real interest rate, which has a 
negative effect on output, is lower.  In the U.S. model, however, 
a positive price shock with no change in the nominal interest 
rate is contractionary. In the short run, the aggregate price level 
rises more than wage rates rise, so a fall in real income occurs.  
Real wealth also falls.  These effects are contractionary on 
demand.  In addition, the empirical results suggest that 
households respond to nominal interest rates and not real 
interest rates, so there is no positive household response to 
lower real interest rates.  The net effect of a positive price shock 
with no change in the nominal interest rate is contractionary in 
the U.S. model.  If this is true, then the Federal Reserve, in 
response to a positive price shock, does not have to increase the 




Estimated rule 4.12 0.69 1.14
Calibrated rule (1.50, Taylor) 4.04 0.61 2.86
Calibrated rule (.25) 3.57 0.71 1.19
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The simulation period is 1993:1-1998:4. Y is real GDP, P is the GDP 
deflator, and r is the three-month Treasury bill rate. The variability
measures are the squares of percentage points. The rules are described 
in the text.
The judging of interest rate rules . . . can be 
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achieve a contraction.  There will be a contraction even if there 
is no increase in the nominal interest rate at all!
The judging of interest rate rules therefore can be sensitive to 
the economic model used.  Using an economic model in which 
positive price shocks are expansionary—as Clarida, Galí, and 
Gertler do—leads to a much different conclusion than using a 
macroeconometric model like the U.S. model, in which positive 
price shocks are contractionary. Using small, calibrated models 
to make policy conclusions is risky if the models are at odds 
with more empirically based ones. It may be that the 
specification and calibration have not captured reality well.  68 Actual Federal Reserve Policy Behavior and Interest Rate Rules
Quarter ru Quarter ru
1954:1 1.08 0.41 0.67 1.99 5.23 0.85 1967:1 4.53 5.67 -1.14 -0.27 3.81 6.10
1954:2 0.81 0.27 0.55 1.29 5.78 3.69 1967:2 3.66 5.54 -1.88 1.68 3.81 -0.54
1954:3 0.87 0.36 0.51 0.75 5.97 10.01 1967:3 4.34 5.72 -1.37 3.01 3.78 18.80
1954:4 1.04 1.23 -0.19 0.75 5.36 -1.09 1967:4 4.79 6.37 -1.59 2.72 3.92 6.92
1955:1 1.26 1.94 -0.68 1.23 4.71 6.45 1968:1 5.06 6.65 -1.59 4.98 3.73 3.60
1955:2 1.61 2.52 -0.91 2.00 4.38 0.17 1968:2 5.51 6.86 -1.35 3.97 3.54 0.89
1955:3 1.86 3.10 -1.24 3.79 4.11 5.58 1968:3 5.23 6.96 -1.73 3.48 3.51 15.26
1955:4 2.35 3.27 -0.93 2.89 4.21 -3.17 1968:4 5.58 7.23 -1.65 5.07 3.39 13.59
1956:1 2.38 3.53 -1.15 1.42 4.03 2.33 1969:1 6.14 7.69 -1.55 4.09 3.38 -1.31
1956:2 2.60 3.48 -0.89 2.67 4.19 0.92 1969:2 6.24 7.75 -1.51 4.99 3.42 1.15
1956:3 2.60 3.85 -1.25 3.58 4.13 1.76 1969:3 7.05 7.53 -0.49 4.64 3.59 6.25
1956:4 3.06 3.91 -0.85 1.34 4.10 0.27 1969:4 7.32 7.83 -0.52 4.54 3.58 7.88
1957:1 3.17 4.44 -1.27 4.30 3.95 1.29 1970:1 7.26 7.17 0.09 3.23 4.16 9.29
1957:2 3.16 4.29 -1.14 1.55 4.06 -0.04 1970:2 6.75 6.74 0.01 5.08 4.75 5.13
1957:3 3.38 4.30 -0.91 2.96 4.21 1.14 1970:3 6.37 6.24 0.13 3.13 5.17 21.44
1957:4 3.34 3.70 -0.36 0.35 4.92 -4.16 1970:4 5.36 5.94 -0.59 3.07 5.80 -14.35
1958:1 1.84 2.28 -0.45 0.20 6.28 3.48 1971:1 3.86 5.60 -1.74 6.21 5.91 16.99
1958:2 1.02 0.83 0.18 -1.11 7.36 0.06 1971:2 4.21 5.84 -1.63 4.99 5.91 10.58
1958:3 1.71 1.07 0.64 0.38 7.31 10.24 1971:3 5.05 6.40 -1.35 4.27 5.98 12.58
1958:4 2.79 2.30 0.49 0.18 6.35 2.60 1971:4 4.23 6.44 -2.21 3.63 5.95 -12.19
1959:1 2.80 2.73 0.07 1.33 5.80 4.84 1972:1 3.44 5.90 -2.46 5.42 5.77 18.84
1959:2 3.02 2.94 0.08 0.56 5.10 0.75 1972:2 3.75 6.17 -2.42 2.89 5.66 6.14
1959:3 3.53 2.85 0.68 1.15 5.29 3.41 1972:3 4.24 6.56 -2.32 4.25 5.58 10.20
1959:4 4.30 2.60 1.70 0.20 5.59 -4.99 1972:4 4.85 6.91 -2.06 5.71 5.30 5.01
1960:1 3.94 2.88 1.06 1.15 5.16 0.58 1973:1 5.64 7.28 -1.64 6.29 4.95 5.95
1960:2 3.09 2.58 0.51 2.17 5.23 -0.27 1973:2 6.61 7.53 -0.92 7.96 4.89 12.45
1960:3 2.39 2.16 0.23 -0.40 5.55 5.29 1973:3 8.39 7.86 0.53 7.90 4.79 -0.09
1960:4 2.36 1.73 0.63 0.40 6.25 -2.63 1973:4 7.46 7.99 -0.52 7.10 4.77 8.46
1961:1 2.38 1.31 1.06 -0.72 6.77 7.69 1974:1 7.60 7.39 0.21 11.47 5.09 3.25
1961:2 2.32 1.02 1.30 -1.25 6.97 1.10 1974:2 8.27 8.11 0.16 11.67 5.16 8.56
1961:3 2.32 1.15 1.17 1.18 6.75 6.72 1974:3 8.29 8.36 -0.07 12.83 5.58 -0.63
1961:4 2.48 1.76 0.71 1.67 6.17 0.74 1974:4 7.34 7.42 -0.09 10.37 6.56 4.82
1962:1 2.74 2.31 0.43 1.65 5.61 1.94 1975:1 5.87 5.78 0.09 8.26 8.22 3.38
1962:2 2.72 2.51 0.21 1.83 5.48 0.66 1975:2 5.40 4.94 0.46 4.83 8.83 20.43
1962:3 2.86 2.25 0.61 -0.59 5.54 3.09 1975:3 6.34 5.74 0.59 7.30 8.47 -1.66
1962:4 2.80 2.40 0.40 1.44 5.51 4.82 1975:4 5.68 6.00 -0.32 6.69 8.26 1.03
1963:1 2.91 2.24 0.67 1.96 5.78 1.22 1976:1 4.95 5.78 -0.82 6.84 7.72 10.21
1963:2 2.94 2.27 0.67 -0.28 5.68 2.46 1976:2 5.17 5.83 -0.66 4.44 7.53 7.94
1963:3 3.28 2.40 0.88 0.63 5.49 6.50 1976:3 5.17 5.95 -0.78 6.87 7.70 0.20
1963:4 3.50 2.54 0.95 1.88 5.57 3.77 1976:4 4.70 5.68 -0.98 6.81 7.73 9.49
1964:1 3.54 2.65 0.88 1.67 5.46 1.58 1977:1 4.62 5.92 -1.29 8.93 7.49 12.65
1964:2 3.48 2.83 0.65 1.43 5.22 2.70 1977:2 4.83 6.50 -1.67 7.76 7.10 6.01
1964:3 3.50 3.11 0.39 1.83 4.99 15.32 1977:3 5.47 6.71 -1.24 6.66 6.86 9.01
1964:4 3.69 3.38 0.31 0.91 4.95 1.87 1977:4 6.14 7.02 -0.89 7.22 6.61 6.38
1965:1 3.90 3.69 0.21 3.76 4.87 0.21 1978:1 6.41 7.14 -0.73 6.46 6.33 7.82
1965:2 3.88 3.92 -0.04 2.10 4.66 -1.29 1978:2 6.48 7.50 -1.02 10.04 6.00 9.66
1965:3 3.86 4.22 -0.36 2.94 4.35 14.91 1978:3 7.32 7.66 -0.34 9.69 6.02 7.52
1965:4 4.16 4.85 -0.69 3.94 4.10 6.35 1978:4 8.68 8.00 0.68 7.77 5.88 6.20
1966:1 4.63 5.44 -0.81 4.27 3.85 4.27 1979:1 9.36 8.15 1.21 9.05 5.88 4.53
1966:2 4.60 5.63 -1.03 2.82 3.81 -3.27 1979:2 9.37 8.11 1.26 9.66 5.71 11.85
1966:3 5.05 5.64 -0.60 4.17 3.75 7.59 1979:3 9.63 8.15 1.48 11.57 5.87 14.40
1966:4 5.25 6.02 -0.77 3.03 3.68 2.31 1979:4 11.80 11.57 0.24 9.64 5.94 5.69
Source: Author’s calculations.
r ˆ rr ˆ – p · m · r ˆ rr ˆ – p · m ·
Appendix: Variable Values, 1954:1-1999:3FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 69
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1980:1 13.46 12.89 0.57 11.85 6.30 -0.09 1990:1 7.76 5.76 2.00 5.33 5.30 7.95
1980:2 10.05 10.98 -0.93 6.63 7.32 8.29 1990:2 7.77 5.83 1.94 3.06 5.34 7.30
1980:3 9.24 10.93 -1.69 9.14 7.68 10.40 1990:3 7.49 5.54 1.95 4.25 5.69 1.88
1980:4 13.71 14.17 -0.46 9.07 7.40 0.82 1990:4 7.02 5.09 1.93 4.44 6.11 -0.32
1981:1 14.37 14.92 -0.55 9.42 7.43 8.48 1991:1 6.05 4.38 1.67 1.12 6.57 8.13
1981:2 14.83 14.68 0.15 7.59 7.40 3.71 1991:2 5.59 3.92 1.67 0.91 6.82 6.62
1981:3 15.09 14.62 0.47 8.00 7.42 2.47 1991:3 5.41 3.93 1.48 1.06 6.85 10.89
1981:4 12.02 13.49 -1.47 6.70 8.24 9.85 1991:4 4.58 3.71 0.88 1.40 7.10 6.76
1982:1 12.90 13.50 -0.60 4.72 8.84 -0.25 1992:1 3.91 3.22 0.69 2.34 7.38 20.21
1982:2 12.36 12.99 -0.63 3.73 9.43 -0.39 1992:2 3.72 3.25 0.48 2.62 7.60 4.67
1982:3 9.71 10.88 -1.17 4.40 9.94 13.74 1992:3 3.13 3.20 -0.07 1.99 7.63 14.48
1982:4 7.94 8.90 -0.97 3.10 10.68 13.26 1992:4 3.08 3.30 -0.22 2.52 7.41 15.11
1983:1 8.08 8.72 -0.64 2.03 10.40 15.76 1993:1 2.99 3.75 -0.76 3.16 7.15 3.32
1983:2 8.42 8.82 -0.40 3.17 10.10 9.50 1993:2 2.98 3.65 -0.67 2.64 7.07 12.98
1983:3 9.19 8.69 0.49 3.93 9.36 7.39 1993:3 3.02 3.82 -0.80 1.51 6.80 12.56
1983:4 8.79 8.71 0.08 3.65 8.54 3.38 1993:4 3.08 3.93 -0.85 1.82 6.62 7.32
1984:1 9.13 8.20 0.93 2.79 7.87 19.73 1994:1 3.25 3.81 -0.56 0.99 6.56 7.10
1984:2 9.84 8.45 1.39 4.19 7.48 3.06 1994:2 4.04 4.10 -0.06 2.21 6.17 -1.27
1984:3 10.34 7.89 2.45 2.44 7.45 -2.33 1994:3 4.51 4.28 0.23 3.49 6.00 0.93
1984:4 8.97 7.28 1.70 2.75 7.28 10.01 1994:4 5.28 4.30 0.98 1.90 5.62 -0.86
1985:1 8.18 6.47 1.72 3.14 7.28 6.49 1995:1 5.78 4.37 1.41 2.69 5.47 0.39
1985:2 7.52 6.40 1.12 2.66 7.29 11.81 1995:2 5.62 3.98 1.65 2.46 5.68 1.17
1985:3 7.10 6.33 0.77 2.94 7.21 22.83 1995:3 5.38 3.71 1.67 1.93 5.67 -3.19
1985:4 7.15 6.53 0.61 3.35 7.05 5.61 1995:4 5.27 3.63 1.64 1.13 5.58 -0.56
1986:1 6.89 6.22 0.67 0.58 7.02 16.02 1996:1 4.95 3.69 1.26 2.25 5.54 -2.56
1986:2 6.13 5.73 0.40 1.33 7.18 19.97 1996:2 5.04 3.64 1.40 2.06 5.48 1.35
1986:3 5.53 5.76 -0.23 3.24 6.99 7.98 1996:3 5.14 3.91 1.22 1.50 5.27 6.17
1986:4 5.34 5.75 -0.41 2.17 6.84 31.13 1996:4 4.97 3.84 1.13 0.77 5.31 -3.21
1987:1 5.53 6.21 -0.67 2.91 6.62 -6.63 1997:1 5.06 3.85 1.21 3.01 5.23 5.72
1987:2 5.73 6.23 -0.50 3.41 6.28 8.51 1997:2 5.07 4.08 0.99 0.23 4.98 4.45
1987:3 6.03 6.31 -0.28 3.50 6.01 4.41 1997:3 5.06 4.15 0.91 1.04 4.86 -1.30
1987:4 6.00 6.25 -0.25 3.09 5.87 0.36 1997:4 5.09 4.24 0.85 1.05 4.67 6.14
1988:1 5.76 6.04 -0.28 2.96 5.73 9.72 1998:1 5.05 4.23 0.82 -0.18 4.65 4.30
1988:2 6.23 6.24 -0.01 4.21 5.49 10.22 1998:2 4.98 4.43 0.55 1.03 4.42 3.12
1988:3 6.99 6.43 0.56 3.69 5.49 0.46 1998:3 4.82 4.34 0.48 0.94 4.53 4.01
1988:4 7.70 6.43 1.27 3.88 5.35 -3.86 1998:4 4.25 4.39 -0.14 0.13 4.43 8.42
1989:1 8.53 6.29 2.24 4.14 5.22 2.99 1999:1 4.41 4.61 -0.20 1.96 4.28 2.44
1989:2 8.44 6.22 2.22 4.80 5.24 3.42 1999:2 4.45 4.94 -0.48 2.02 4.26 0.66
1989:3 7.85 5.74 2.11 2.30 5.28 -0.61 1999:3 4.65 4.92 -0.27 1.45 4.22 -2.80
1989:4 7.63 5.46 2.17 3.25 5.37 0.03
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1. Paul Volcker was chairman of the Federal Reserve between 1979:3 
and 1987:2, but the period in question is only 1979:4 to 1982:3.
2. The data used for all estimates and tests in this article, including 
the data on the first-stage regressors, are available at <http://
fairmodel.econ.yale.edu>. The results can be duplicated by 
downloading the data and some software from the site. The price 
variable used to construct the inflation variable is the price deflator for 
domestic sales.  This variable was used in Fair (1978), and has been 
used ever since in equation 1.  The three-month Treasury bill rate is 
used for the interest rate.  Although in practice the Federal Reserve 
controls the federal funds rate, the quarterly average of the federal 
funds rate and the quarterly average of the three-month Treasury bill 
rate are so highly correlated that it makes little difference which rate is 
used in estimated interest rate rules using quarterly data.  The money 
supply data are from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
3. See Fair (1994, Chapter 5) for the use of this test.  The latest tests are 
available at <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu>.
4. See Fair (1994, Chapter 4) for a general discussion of these types 
of tests.
5. See Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan (1984).
6. The output gap measure used is (YS - Y)/YS, where Y is actual output 
and YS is a measure of potential output. These variables are in the U.S. 
model, which can be found at <http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu>. YS is 
computed as potential productivity   potential employment, where 
both potential series are computed from peak-to-peak interpolations.
7. See, for example, Feldstein and Stock (1993), Hall and Mankiw 
(1993), Judd and Motley (1993), Clark (1994), Croushore and Stark 
(1994), Thornton (1995), Fair and Howrey (1996), Rudebusch (1999), 
Fair (2000), and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000). Taylor (1985, p. 61, 
fn. 1) cites much of the literature prior to 1985.
8. In the following discussion, “variance” is used to refer to a 
particular measure of variability, not an actual variance.  Variances of 
endogenous variables differ over time, and the variability measure is 
roughly an average of the quarterly variances across time.References
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